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This paper proposes a corporate governance model that reflects economic, 
political, social, and cultural aspirations of Africa. A model that 
complements the market structure, minimize stakeholders conflict, ensures 
stability and is fit for an emerging market seeking to compete and integrate 
with the rest of the world.    
 
1. Introduction  
 
There are several models of corporate governance. Weimer and Pape 
identify up to four models: Anglo-Saxon model, Germanic model, Latin 
model and Japanese model.1 These models have different characteristics, 
but the dividing tenets are; the level of social consideration, the use of 
productive private property and the operation of the market.2 These factors 
have been utilised by scholars to categorise corporate governance models 
into two broad types, the stakeholder model and the shareholder model.  
These are also the two models copied by African countries and for 
this reason, this paper would focus on the above two models of corporate 
governance.    
The two models can be traced back to class and industrial conflicts 
and how the government resolved them.3 For instance, in Germany, the 
strength of trade unions is reflected in their involvement in decision making 
through membership on supervisory board.  
Governance models do not function in isolation because they 
interact with other factors of the economy.4 This is so because the 
effectiveness of any governance model depends on how well it fits within 
                                                 
1 Jeroen Weimer and Joost C. Pape, (1999), ‘A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 152-166.  
2 Uwe Becker, (2009), Open Varieties of Capitalism: Continuity, Change and Performance, Palgrave, 
Macmillan. 
3 Streech W.  (2005), ‘Rejoinder: On Terminology, Functionalism, Historical Institutionalism and 
Liberalisation’,  Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 577-587. 
4 Hall P.A. and David Soskice (2001), Variety of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
      
 
other features of the country.5 This paper adopts this approach in 
proposing an alternative corporate governance model that is more attuned 
to the realities in Africa.   
It begins by analysing the shareholder and stakeholder model 
applicable in Africa focusing on their characteristics before proposing 
alternative models for Africa.  
 
2. Current Corporate Governance Models in Africa 
 
Stakeholder and shareholder models have divergent characteristics as 
reflected in their approach towards capitalism and socialism. 
Characteristics of the two models are examined and later analyzed in 
conjuncture with the realities in Africa pointing out elements of the two 
models that should or should not be borrowed by Africa.  
 
2.1 Characteristics of Stakeholder Model     
 
Stakeholder model is premise on the idea that corporations should be 
managed for the interest of all stakeholders and not only for profit 
maximization for shareholders.6 The system caters for the interest of the 
nation as a whole and firms are considered to exist for the common good of 
the economy and not only for shareholders. Stakeholder model includes all 
interest groups in the corporate governance framework and utilizes a 
distributive approach in the management of corporations. The aim is to 
benefit all those who contribute in sustaining a corporation.7 In addition, 
the system provides non-shareholder stakeholders with enough powers to 
monitor management.8 Other interest groups such as employees can 
directly protect their interest through seats on the supervisory board. It 
promotes a ‘stakeholder society’ where corporations have regard to 
economic, social and political consequences of their decision as oppose to 
the sole aim of creating wealth for shareholders. 
                                                 
5 Michel Goyer, (2008), ‘Capital Mobility, Variety of Institutional Investors, and the Transforming Stability 
of Corporate Governance in France and Germany’, in Bob Hancke, Martin Rhodes and Mark Thatcher 
(eds.) Beyond Variety of Capitalism: Conflicts, Contradictions, and Complementarities in European 
Economy, Oxford University Press.   
6 W. Evans and R.E. Freeman, ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’, in T. Beauchamp and 
N. Bowie (eds), (1976) Ethical Theory and Business, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
7 See Dean J., (2001), Directing Public Companies, London: Cavendish  
8 W. Hatton, (1995), The state we’re In, London: Jonathan Cape.  
      
 
Characteristics of a stakeholder model includes one in which there is 
pressure for low risk investment and expansion, pressure for the 
minimisation of disruptive organisational changes, and preferences that 
favour employee incentive. The system discourages shareholder driven 
stimulus such as high incentive compensation and hostile takeovers.9 
Stakeholder model have a socialist’s policy where the rights of employees 
and the community are protected.10   
 
2.2 Characteristics of Shareholder Model 
 
Shareholder model is design to maximize profit for shareholders with little 
regards to the interest of other stakeholders.11 Workers receive a wage for 
their productivity and must ensure that the company makes profit as a 
condition for their continuous employment.12 Unlike in stakeholder model, 
non-shareholder stakeholders have no institutional claim to share in the 
profit of corporations because shareholders are the residual owners and 
get all the profit.13 Corporate governance in shareholder model is defined 
narrowly, and limited to shareholders interest.14 Responsibility of 
supervising managers is also limited to shareholders.15   
The model is premise on capitalist tendencies where profit 
maximisation is paramount.16 The system gives shareholders complete 
control over the allocation of production that is; they decide what is 
produced and how it is done. In shareholder economies, the interests of 
other interest groups are not protected and they have no direct means of 
monitoring management. The interests of trade unions, ethnic groups and 
local communities are considered as external interests and not directly 
protected.17  
As a consequence, corporate governance rules are designed to give 
shareholders greater power to monitor management and receive 
                                                 
9 Mark Roe, (2003), Political Determinant of Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press. 
10Adam Przeworski, (1993), Capitalism and Social Democracy , Cambridge Uni. Press 
11 L. Johnson and D. Million (1989), ‘Missing the Point About State Takeover Statute’, 87 Michigan 
Review,    
12 Anthony Giddens, (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Blackwell publishers.   
13 Anthony Giddens (1998) op cit 
14 G. Crepi, (2007), ‘Maximising the Wealth of Frictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors 
Embrace’, Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 32.  
15 Shleifer A. and R.W. Vishny (1997), ‘ A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 
No. 2 pp. 737-783  
16 William K. (2000), ‘From Shareholder Value to present –day Capitalism’, Economy and Society,  
17 James S. Coleman, (2000), Foundation of Social Theory, Harvard Business Press. 
      
 
information at the expense of other stakeholders. Board composition, 
which is an important monitoring organ, is designed with only shareholder 
representatives by excluding other stakeholder groups from the board. 
Market mechanisms of monitoring such as takeovers and market for 
corporate control are common.18  
 
 
3. Alternative Corporate Governance Models for African   
 
There is no conclusive evidence that any one model of corporate 
governance is superior to the other as both shareholder model and 
stakeholder model have their advantages and disadvantages. For instance 
shareholder model with market-based governance structure enhances 
corporate accountability by aggregating information in the market and 
disseminating them to investors.19 On the other hand, stakeholder model is 
better at preserving stability as involvement of other stakeholders prevents 
conflict.    
The effective of any model of corporate governance is thus 
dependent on how well it is coordinated and blended into other factors of a 
region. For this reason, this paper would focus on the characteristics that 
should be present in any African corporate governance model. The model 
can be adjusted in different markets and in line with developments in a 
market. 
  
3.1 Characteristics of an African Model of Corporate Governance 
 
Africa can be divided into two groups in terms of their approach towards 
regulating corporate governance. The first group is countries with 
corporate governance codes (mostly Anglo-Saxon countries and some Arab 
countries). The second group is countries without corporate governance 
codes (mostly Francophone countries and also some Arab countries). 
Countries with corporate governance codes with the exception of Nigeria 
adopted an inclusive approach more in line with the stakeholder model. On 
                                                 
18 Gourevitch, Peter Alexis, and James Shinn. (2005) Political power and corporate control: The new 
global politics of corporate governance. Princeton University Press. 
19 Allen F. and Gale D. (1999), Comparing Financial Systems, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
      
 
the other hand, African countries without corporate governance codes 
adopted a shareholder model, such as OHADA20 states.  
In the case of OHADA states, the rules were largely foreign21 while in 
Anglo-Saxon states the codes reflected the UK corporate governance Codes 
though with some exceptions.  
Mindful of the need for corporate governance to reflect economic, 
political and socio-cultural challenges in African, the paper argues that the 
following features should be included in any African model of corporate 
governance.   
 
 
3.1.1 Inclusive approach with stakeholders’ involvement 
 
Part of the problem leading to conflict in the management of natural 
resources in Africa is poor management of rival groups, in particular, failure 
to have regard to the interest of all stakeholders. Some scholars have 
argued that the protection of the interest of all stakeholders should not be 
left at the discretion of managers and shareholders.22 To avoid conflict and 
ensure stability, the interest of all stakeholders should be directly included 
into the corporate governance framework.  
An inclusive approach is more pertinent considering the fact that 
many companies in Africa are involved in natural resource exploitation 
viewed as belonging to every citizen. It is also in line with Africa’s 
communitarian values. This can be done in several ways such as employees’ 
and local community representatives on boards, providing equal 
opportunity to local and foreign workers in terms of career progression and 
board diversity as discussed below.   
 
 
3.1.2 Diverse and Independent Board with Employee Representatives   
 
In keeping with an inclusive approach, employees and other stakeholders 
group should be provided with seats on boards. Some countries such as 
                                                 
20 OHADA stands for Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires’ or Organisation 
for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa. 
21 Rachael Ntongho (2012) “Political Economy of the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa”, Journal of 
Politics and Law; Vol. 5, No. 2; 2012.   
22 Timothy J. Lewis, Silke Machold, David Oxtoby, and P.K. Ahmed, (2004), op cit. 
      
 
Ivory Coast already has such a provision. It is argued that other 
stakeholders other than shareholders are highly committed in their 
responsibility to contributing to governance and monitoring of senior 
managers.23 Some have argued that this may be one of the reasons why 
executive compensation in stakeholder states are lower compared to 
shareholder states.24   
  Research has equally shown that women on boards improve access 
to information and monitoring and enhanced creativity while providing a 
wider view of issues.25 According to the 2014 MSCI survey of women on 
board, 15.1% of board members in Africa and Middle East are women. In 
Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria 2013 statistics figures indicates that 
15% of board members are women.26 South Africa’s score is better at 17.9 
according to the MSCI 2014 survey of women on board.27  
Absence of women on boards in Africa reduces the pool of 
knowledge and varied perspective that women have been shown to bring 
on boards.28 Boards with women according to MSCI are less corrupt, 
fraudulent, involve in bribery and shareholder battle.29    
  
3.1.3 Application of Domestic or Regional Rules    
  
Low level of competition, legal and institutional arrangement of corporate 
governance, ownership structure, and political and social orientation of 
Africa are not always suitable for international norms and practices. The 
purpose of corporate governance is to ensure that specific objectives of 
individual corporations are achieved. Domestics rules that would achieve 
                                                 
23 Hall P.A and D.W Gingerich (2001), ‘Variety of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the 
Macro Economy: An Empirical Analysis’, Paper presented at the American Political Science Association 
Conference, San Francisco. See also Noteboom B. (1999), ‘Voice and exit-based Forms of Corporate 
Control: Anglo-American, European and Japanese’, Journal of Economic, Issues 33, pp. 845-860.  
24 Trond Randøy and Jim Nielsen, (2002), ‘Company Performance, Corporate Governance and CEO 
Compensation in Norway and Sweden’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 57-81. 
25 Lincoln A. and Adedoyin O. (2012) “Corporate Governance and Gender Diversity in the Nigerian 
Boardroom” International Journal of Social, Education, Economics and Management Engineering, Vol 6, 
No. 11, pp. 659 – 664. 
26 Ibid. 
27 2014 MSCI Survey at http://30percentclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014-Survey-of-Women-on-
Boards-1.pdf 
28 Oba, Victor Chiedu, and Musa Inuwa Fodio. (2013) “Boards Gender Mix as a Predictor of Financial 
Performance on Nigeria: An Empirical Study,” International Journal of Economics & Finance, Vol. 5, No. 
2, pp. 170-178.  
29 2014 MSCI Survey at http://30percentclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014-Survey-of-Women-on-
Boards-1.pdf 
      
 
these objectives should be encouraged because they are easily understood 
compared to international rules. Rules chosen should reflect corporate 
history, size, jurisdiction and stakeholder composition.30 Any regulation on 
corporate governance should combine these factors and create an enabling 
environment where market actors clearly understand the rules. Foreign 
rules do not always work well in Africa. For instance, in Cameroon, 
practitioners do not understand what a ‘bilan social’ (social balance sheet) 
is as it is a concept imported from France31.   
This paper is not rejected international rule as in some cases such as 
in accounting, it can be beneficial to adopt international accounting rules 
for standardization.  But in other areas, rules imported from the West that 
do not blend neatly into African legal systems are difficult to implement 
and should be cautiously adopted. 
 
3.1.4 Mandatory rather than Self-regulation in key areas   
 
As Panitch and Gindin argue, “State intervention, do not necessarily distort 
efficiency.”32 Corruption is a major factor in limiting competition in Africa. It 
equally affects trust and the free flow of the market.  
As a result of corruption, weak competition, little regard for 
corporate social responsibility and business ethics and a market more 
exposed to fraud, mandatory rather than self-regulation can boost trust in 
the market. Disclosure rules on corporates social responsibility and ethics 
should be mandatory. Individuals such as directors should be liable to 
fragrant breach of health and safety and accounting rules.  
 As Nordberg and McNulty mentions, the financial crisis of 2008 
exposed some of the limitations of self-regulation.33 For instance, a cap on 
executive pay by the European Union to prevent exorbitant remunerations 
is an example of failure of the market to regulate itself. Mandatory rule in 
                                                 
30 Elaine Sternberg (2004) op cit. p. 158 
31 Elad, Charles, and Martha Tumnde, (2009) "Bookkeeping and the probative value of accounting records: 
Savary's legacy lingers on in the OHADA Treaty states." International Journal of Critical Accounting 
Vol.1, iss. 1, pp. 82-109. 
32 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, ‘Euro-Capitalism and American Empire in David Coates (ed.), (2005) 
Variety of Capitalism, Variety of Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 141.  
33 Nordberg, Donald, and Terry McNulty, (2013), "Creating better boards through codification: 
Possibilities and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992–2010." Business History, vol. 55, No. 3 pp. 
348-374. 
      
 
key areas such as board representation and employee rights can prevent 
social conflicts in Africa.  
    
Conclusion  
 
As Letza and Kirkbride argue, “corporate governance is a social rather than 
purely economic or mathematical reality, a processual rather than fixed and 
relatively enduring reality.”34 It cannot therefore be isolated from social, 
political, legislative, cultural, institutional, and other domestic factors.35 
This paper advocates a pluralistic and flexible approach that fits the 
market realities in Africa rather than a system copied from the west. A good 
starting point is the variety of capitalism literature, which discusses the 
different approaches to capitalism and corporate governance models.36 
Irrespective of the model adopted by African counties, due regards 
should be given to the specific aspiration of the region rather than the urge 
to blindly follow international trend that may not reflect African values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                 
34 Stephen Letza and James Kirkbride, (2008), ‘Corporate Governance Theorising: Limits, Critics and 
Alternatives’, International Journal of Law and management, Vol.  50, No. 1, pp. 17-32, at p. 26 
35 Ibid.  
36 See for instance Bob Hancke, (2009) Debating Variety of Capitalism: A Reader, Oxford University 
Press, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), (2001) Variety of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press.  
